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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3 )G), had 
original jurisdiction over this appeal. The Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to its authority 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102( 4), transferred the appeal to this Court. This Court 
has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court correctly conclude that the second dismissal of 
Appellant's Complaint against Appellee for failure to timely serve Appellee with a 
summons and complaint pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4 should have been a dismissal with 
prejudice rather than without prejudice because Appellant's action had once before been 
dismissed without prejudice for failure to timely serve and the action was subsequently 
re-filed pursuant to Utah's Savings Statute (Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-1 l 1)? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's conclusions of law for 
correctness. Callahan v. Sheaffer, 877 P.2d 1259, 1260 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994). 
Preservation of the Issue: The issue was briefed to the trial court and the trial 
court ruled on the issue in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice dated March 9, 2015. 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining that Appellant's 
ex-parte Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) Motion for Relief From Order was improperly granted 
because the motion was not properly presented or timely filed and because Utah R. Civ. 
P. 60(b) is not intended to allow a plaintiff additional time to resuscitate an action beyond 
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the time allowed by applicable statutes of limitation and the one-year allowed by Utah's 
Savings Statute (Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-111 )? 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's ruling on a Utah R. Civ. P. 
60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ,r,r 10-11, 11 P.3d 
277. ("We will generally reverse a trial court's denial of a rule 60(b) motion only where 
the court has exceeded its discretion." Id.) 
Preservation of the Issue: The issue was briefed to the trial court and the trial 
court ruled on the issue in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice dated March 9, 2015. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-111: 
(1) If any action is timely filed and the judgment for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in the action or upon a cause of action 
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or 
contract for commencing the action has expired, the plaintiff, or ifhe dies 
and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a new 
action within one year after the reversal or failure. 
(2) On and after December 31, 2007, a new action may be commenced 
under this section only once. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b ): 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ( 1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
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intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or ( 6) any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 90 days after 
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under 
this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding 
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This civil action arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on December 
6, 2006 in Uintah, Utah. On December 3, 2010, plaintiff/appellant Thomas Norton 
(hereafter "Norton") filed a complaint in the Second District Court in and for Weber 
County alleging that defendant/appellee Autumn Hess (hereafter "Hess") negligently 
caused the accident and that Norton sustained personal injuries as a result. The trial court 
dismissed Norton's case without prejudice on November 22, 2011 because Norton failed 
to timely serve Hess with a summons and complaint pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b). 
The dismissal of Norton's complaint occurred after the statute of limitations had 
run on his negligence claim. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-111, Utah's Savings 
Statute, Norton could re-file his complaint within one year of the November 22, 2011 
dismissal. 
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On November 21, 2012, Norton again filed a complaint in the Second District 
Court in and for Weber County asserting the same allegations against Hess that he 
asserted in his initial complaint. On April 18, 2013, the trial court dismissed Norton's 
complaint a second time because Norton again failed to timely serve Hess with a 
summons and complaint pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b). 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
Norton filed his first complaint three days before the expiration of the four-year 
statute of limitation applicable to negligence actions. (R. 160). The trial court dismissed 
that complaint, without prejudice, on November 22, 2011 because Norton failed to timely 
serve Hess with a summons and complaint pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b). (R. 160). A 
year later, on November 21, 2012, Norton re-filed his complaint with the Second District 
Court. (R. 1). The trial court dismissed Norton's second complaint, without prejudice, 
on April 18, 2013 because Norton again failed to timely serve Hess with a summons and 
complaint pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b). (R. 10). One year later, on April 18, 2014, 
Norton filed an ex parte Motion for Relief from Order Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
(R. 11). On April 28, 2014, the trial court granted Norton's Rule 60(b) motion. (R. 16). 
On May 8, 2014, Norton served a summons and complaint to Hess. (R. 17). Hess then 
filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6). (R. 19). 
Norton opposed Hess' motion and the trial court heard oral argument on Hess' motion on 
October 9, 2014. (R. 77, 178). After hearing oral argument on the motion to dismiss, the 
trial court granted Hess' motion and instructed Hess' counsel to prepare an order. (R. 
194-195). Hess' counsel served a proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
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Order to Norton's counsel, and on November 7, 2014, Norton's counsel filed Plaintiffs 
Objections to Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice. (R. 102). Hess filed a response to Norton's objections, and 
Norton replied in support of the objections. (R. 107, 112). On December 18, 2014, the 
trial court heard oral argument on Norton's objections to the proposed Order. (R. 116, 
197). Hess' counsel filed an amended proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice on December 29, 2014. (R. 122). On March 9, 
2015, the trial court signed and entered the amended proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. (R. 159). Norton filed a 
Notice of Appeal on April 8, 2015. (R. 167). 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED 
FOR REVIEW 
I. Norton's action arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on 
December 6, 2006. Norton timely filed a complaint against Hess on December 3, 2010 
(Second District Court civil case no. 100909529). (R. 31-32, 160). 
2. Norton did not serve Hess with a summons and complaint within 120 days 
as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b ), and in April 2011, Norton's counsel requested from 
the trial court additional time to serve Hess. The trial court granted the request. (R. 160). 
3. On November 22, 2011, the trial court dismissed Norton's Complaint 
without prejudice because Norton again failed to timely serve Hess with a summons and 
complaint. (R. 31-32, 160). 
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4. On November 21, 2012, Norton re-filed his Complaint against Hess 
(Second District Court civil case no. 120907652).1 (R. 1). 
5. Again, Norton did not timely serve Hess with a summons and complaint 
within 120 days. In March 2013, Norton's counsel requested from the trial court 
additional time to serve Hess. The trial court did not grant Norton's request for 
additional time. (R. 6, 9, 123). 
6. On April 18, 2013, the trial court dismissed Norton's complaint due to his 
failure to timely serve Hess with a summons and complaint pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
@ 
4(b ). (R. 10). ~ 
7. The Order of Dismissal was generated by the Court's electronic system 
which automatically reflected a dismissal without prejudice due to Norton's failure to 
timely serve Hess pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b) despite the fact that Norton's 
complaint had once before been dismissed without prejudice. (R. 10, 187). 
8. The Order of Dismissal reads: "Based on a review of this file and Rule 
4(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court orders this case dismissed, without 
prejudice, for failure to serve the defendant within 120 days of filing the Complaint. This 
is the final order of the court. No further order is required." (R. 10). 
1 Although the four-year statute of limitation applicable to Norton's claim ran on 
December 6, 2010, because Norton's first complaint failed other than upon the merits, 
Utah's Savings Statute, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-l l l, allowed him an additional year 
from the date of dismissal of the first complaint to re-file his complaint. Norton timely 
re-filed the complaint. (R. 192-193). 
6 
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9. Between September 2013 and April 2014, the original judge assigned to the 
case, Judge Michael D. Lyon, retired and the case was re-assigned among other judges in 
the Second District Court. (R. 161, 193-194 ). 
10. On April 18, 2014, one year after the second dismissal of his complaint, 
Norton filed an ex-parte Motion for Relief from Order Pursuant to Rule 60(b) together 
with a supporting memorandum and proposed Order. (R. 11-16). 
11. On April 28, 2014, Judge Mark R. Decaria, entered Norton's proposed 
Order Granting Motion for Relief from Order Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). (R. 16). 
12. Norton served Hess with a summons and complaint on May 8, 2014. (R. 
17). 
13. Hess filed a Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss on 
May 22, 2014 asserting that the second dismissal of Norton's complaint on April 18, 
2013 should have been a dismissal with prejudice rather than without because the 
complaint had previously failed and Norton could only re-file his complaint once 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-111, Utah's Savings Statute. Hess argued that 
Norton's claims were time barred and therefore the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction and Norton's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. (R. 19-41 ). 
14. Norton filed an opposing memorandum on June 25, 2014, and Hess filed a 
reply memorandum in support of her motion on July 3, 2014. (R. 42, 64). 
15. On October 9, 2014, the trial court heard oral arguments on Hess' motion to 
dismiss. (R. 77, 178). 
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16. At the October 9, 2014 hearing, Judge Joseph Bean stated: 
I am granting the defendant's motion to dismiss in this matter. I find 
that the intent of Rule 60(b) was not to add additional time. Certainly 
under Rule 60(b)(l) [Norton's Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) Motion for Relief from 
Order] was not filed within the 90 day or three month time period required 
under Rule 60(b )( 1) and under Rule 60(b )( 6) certainly Judge DeCaria had 
that - - you know could have taken that under consideration when he 
granted the motion, but I am convinced that the statute, Section 78B-2-111, 
did not intend Rule 60(b) to add additional time onto a savings statute 
especially where there's already been one that was granted and the statute 
specifically limits the extension of time to one bite at the apple. It says it's 
not "" - you can only have one opportunity. 
The deeper I've delved into this Mr. Cardon, the more 
uncomfortable I've become and that's all I'm going to say on that issue and 
I'm confident that definitely the Rule - - sorry, 78B-2-1 l 1 did not intend or 
was not passed with the intent that Rule 60(b) would be able to circumvent 
the limitations put specifically into that statute. 
That's the ruling of the Court and Mr. Hitt I'm going to ask you to 
draft the order. 
(R. 194-195). 
17. Hess' counsel prepared proposed Findings of Pact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice and served a copy to Norton's counsel. (R. 79, 
82). 
18. On November 7, 2014, Norton's counsel filed Plaintiffs Objections to 
Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Dismissal 
with Prejudice. (R. 102). 
19. Hess filed a response to Norton's objections, and Norton replied in support 
of the objections. (R. 107, 112). 
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20. On December 18, 2014, the trial court heard oral argument on Norton's 
objections to the proposed Order. (R. 116, 197). 
21. Hess' counsel filed an amended proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice on December 29, 2014. (R. 122). 
22. On March 9, 2015, the trial court signed and entered the amended proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. (R. 159). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly dismissed Norton's complaint with prejudice because 
Norton failed to timely serve Hess with a summons and complaint as required by Utah R. 
Civ. P. 4(b). Further, the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying Norton 
relief from the Order of Dismissal pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) because the motion 
was not properly presented and that rule was not intended to allow a plaintiff additional 
time to resuscitate an expired claim. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
SECOND DISMISSAL OF NORTON'S COMPLAINT SHOULD 
HA VE BEEN A DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE RATHER THAN 
WITHOUT BECAUSE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD 
RUN ON NORTON'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM AND HE HAD 
PREVIOUSLY RE-FILED HIS COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 
UTAH'S SAVINGS STATUTE AND COULD NOT DO SO AGAIN. 
There is no dispute that Norton's complaint was twice dismissed for failure to 
timely serve Hess with a summons and complaint pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b). There 
is no dispute that the statute oflimitation applicable to Norton's negligence claim expired 
9 
on December 6, 2010, and the first dismissal of Norton's complaint occurred after the 
expiration of the statute of limitation. Consequently, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
2-l 11 (Utah's Savings Statute), Norton could re-file his complaint within one year of the 
first dismissal. Section 78B-2-111 reads: 
( 1) If any action is timely filed and the judgment for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in the action or upon a cause of action 
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or 
contract for commencing the action has expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies 
and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a new 
action within one year after the reversal or failure. 
(2) On and after December 31, 2007, a new action may be commenced 
under this section only once. 
Norton then timely re-filed his action one year after the first dismissal pursuant to the 
Savings Statute. However, after Norton's complaint was dismissed a second time for 
failure to timely serve Hess with a summons and complaint pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
4(b ), that second dismissal, as a matter of law, necessarily had to be a dismissal with 
prejudice because Norton was statutorily barred from filing his complaint a third time. 
The trial court's second dismissal of Norton's complaint on April 18, 2013 was 
mistakenly entered without prejudice.2 Pursuant to 78B-2-1 l 1(2), as a matter of law, the 
dismissal had to be with prejudice because the case had already been re-filed once after it 
2 At the October 9, 2014 hearing on Hess' motion to dismiss, the trial court clerk 
informed the judge and counsel for both parties that when a complaint/case is dismissed 
for failure to timely serve pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4, the Court's electronic system 
generates an order of dismissal that "automatically has the language without prejudice." 
(R. 187). 
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failed on non-substantive grounds. Norton's complaint could not again be re-filed 
because the savings statute allows for a new action to be commenced only once. 
Therefore, although the Court styled the April 2013 dismissal as a dismissal without 
prejudice, the second dismissal was effectively a dismissal with prejudice because the 
savings statute did not allow Norton to re-file his Complaint a third time. This issue is 
controlled directly by statute and legislative authority. 
The trial court correctly concluded, as a matter of law, Norton's claims against 
Hess were time barred and his Complaint was properly dismissed with prejudice because 
the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and Norton's complaint failed to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
DENYING NORTON UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b) RELIEF BECAUSE 
THAT RULE WAS NOT INTENDED TO ALLOW A PLAINTIFF TO 
CIRCUMVENT STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE SAVINGS STATUTE. 
After the trial court dismissed Norton's complaint for the second time on April 18, 
2013, Norton was statutorily barred from filing his complaint a third time. Consequently, 
on April 18, 2014 - an entire year after the second dismissal - Norton attempted to 
circumvent the statute oflimitations and Utah's Savings Statute by filing an ex-parte 
Motion for Relief from Order Pursuant to Rule 60(b ). Although initially granted by an 
interim judge, Judge Bean did not abuse his discretion in denying Norton's motion for 
relief because Judge Bean found that the motion was not properly presented and he 
concluded that Rule 60(b) was not intended to allow additional time to resuscitate an 
11 
expired claim. Further, Norton failed to provide the trial court justification for granting 
Norton relief from the second order of dismissal. 
Because Norton did not seek relief from the second order of dismissal until a year 
after the order was entered, Norton was limited to seeking relief from the order pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) states: 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ( 1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; ( 4) the judgment is void; ( 5) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or ( 6) any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 90 days after 
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under 
this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding 
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
Norton could not seek relief under subsections (1), (2), or (3) when he filed his motion 
for relief because more than 90 days had passed since the trial court entered the order of 
dismissal. Further, subsections (4) and (5) did not apply to the trial court's April 18, 
2013 order of dismissal. Therefore, Norton was limited to arguing subsection (6): "any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of judgment." The trial court properly 
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concluded that there was no reason to justify relief from the order of dismissal and 
therefore dismissed Norton's complaint with prejudice. 
The trial court specifically found that Norton had "numerous opportunities for 
alternative service" available to him, but he failed to pursue those. (R. 192-193 ). For 
example, Judge Bean questioned Norton's counsel as to why he had not sought to serve 
Hess through alternate means such as service by publication. (R. 188-190). Norton's 
counsel stated that his office typically avoids seeking to serve a defendant by publication 
and therefore did not in this case. (R. 188-190). 
Ultimately, the only reason Norton offered to justify Rule 60(b) relief was the fact 
that he could not re-file his complaint a third time. (R. 13-15). The trial court rejected 
that basis for relief by correctly concluding that Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) was not intended to 
be used a vehicle for circumventing statutes of limitation or the statutory provisions of 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-1 l 1. (R. 159-163, 194-195). Judge Bean specifically 
concluded: "I'm confident that definitely ... 78B-2-11 l did not intend or was not passed 
with the intent that Rule 60(b) would be able to circumvent the limitations put 
specifically into that statute." (R. 194 ). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that trial courts have broad discretion in ruling 
upon Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motions. "We will generally reverse a trial court's denial of a 
rule 60(b) motion only where the court has exceeded its discretion." Fisher v. Bybee, 
2004 UT 92, ~7, 104 P.3d 1198 (citing Lund v. Brown, 200 UT 75, ~~ 10-11, 11 P.3d 
277). In fact, the Court further explained in Bybee: 
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The outcome of rule 60(b) motions are rarely vulnerable to attack. We 
grant broad discretion to trial court's rule 60(b) rulings because most are 
equitable in nature, saturated with facts, and call upon judges to apply 
fundamental principles of fairness that that do not easily lend themselves to 
appellate review. 
Id. at ~7 ( citing Oseguera v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 UT App 46, ~~ 9-10, 68 P .3d. 
1008). 
Here, the trial court properly exercised its broad discretion to deny Norton rule 
60(b) relief after giving full consideration to the facts and events surrounding Norton's 
motion. These facts include: Norton waited to file his complaint until three days before 
the four year statute of limitation on his claim expired in December 2010. Norton failed 
to timely serve Hess, he requested an extension of time to serve Hess, and the request was 
granted. Norton again failed to timely serve Hess and the trial court dismissed his 
complaint without prejudice after the statute of limitation on the negligence claim had 
run. Norton then waited a year before re-filing his complaint against Hess pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-11 l. Norton agai_n failed to timely serve Hess and he requested 
additional time to serve Hess, but the request was not granted. Norton's complaint was 
dismissed a second time for failure to timely serve Hess pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4(b). 
At no point did Norton seek to serve Hess by alternate means such as service by 
publication. Furthermore, the record is entirely void of evidence as to the efforts, if any, 
actually taken by Norton to attempt service on Hess prior to either the first or second 
dismissal of his complaints. 
The record before this Court evidences that Norton was given ample opportunity 
to serve Hess and the trial court routinely granted Norton's requests for additional time to 
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serve. Nevertheless, for over three years, Norton failed to serve Hess pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 4. Norton allowed his claim to go stale, he failed to actively pursue it, and his 
complaint was twice dismissed. (The Court will note that after the second dismissal, 
Norton waited a whole year before seeking relief from the dismissal.) Norton received 
two bites of the proverbial apple, but repeatedly failed over the course of more than three 
years to timely serve a summons and complaint in both instances. 
Given Norton's repeated failures to timely serve Hess, the trial court did not abuse 
its broad discretion in concluding that there was no justification for relieving Norton 
pursuant to rule 60(b )( 6) from the second order dismissing his complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's dismissal of Norton's complaint with prejudice should be 
affirmed by this Court. The very essence in the application of Utah's Rules of Civil 
Procedure is "to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 1. Norton's attempts to manipulate the Rules run counter to those 
purposes and would work incredible prejudice against Hess due to the long delays caused 
by Norton's failure to actively pursue his claim. Moreover, it would also make the 
purpose of statutes of limitation null and gut the application of Utah's Savings Statute. 
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of August, 2015. 
PETERSEN & ASSOCIATES 
' 
Attorneys for Appellee Autumn Hess 
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